Why is it that no one can bring the Soviet Union back? Many people ask, during the last years of the USSR, was there really no chance at all? The answer is cruel: it was already too late.

First, what is the prerequisite for a system to be pulled back? For any system to save itself, it needs at least three things: truthful information can still come to light, authority can still coordinate actions, and society can accept short-term sacrifices. As long as one of these remains, there is room for maneuver.

Second, what did the Soviet Union lose in its final stage? On the eve of disintegration, these three elements almost disappeared simultaneously: truthful information was long distorted, decision-making was based on illusions, central authority could no longer command uniformly, local regions began acting independently, and society no longer accepted sacrifices. What does this mean? Any strong measures can no longer be effectively implemented.

Third, why is being tougher actually more dangerous? Here’s the key: when the legitimacy of the system has already loosened, tough measures are essentially an admission of crisis. Admitting crisis further weakens authority. What will be the result? The tougher the approach, the more it exposes out-of-control situations, so you cannot push forcibly nor repair gently.

Fourth, why can’t external forces hold it together either? At this stage, external support cannot rebuild internal trust, economic aid cannot restore institutional authority, diplomatic mediation cannot replace internal legitimacy. The problem with the system is no longer resource scarcity but the failure of its operational logic.

Fifth, the conclusion about the system: the collapse of the Soviet Union was not because the final step was wrong, but because all mechanisms capable of correction had simultaneously failed. When a system loses information, authority, and trust, it has entered an irreversible zone.