Quantum computing becomes a real factor for the Bitcoin market

Quantum computing has long ceased to be a theoretical risk. What now surprises is that its impact is already influencing concrete decisions in institutional portfolios. Data from 2026 demonstrate this: while Bitcoin lags behind gold by 6.5% so far this year, major investors are reconsidering their allocations not due to traditional market cycles, but because of a technological threat that seems increasingly imminent.

Why is Bitcoin lagging behind gold? Quantum computing as a real factor

Bitcoin’s relative performance versus gold in January 2026 reflects something deeper than usual volatility. Christopher Wood, a Jefferies strategist, removed a 10% position in Bitcoin from his “Greed & Fear” model portfolio, reallocating that capital to physical gold and precious metals mining stocks. His justification is compelling: quantum computing could break the ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) keys that protect Bitcoin, transforming the narrative of a store of value into an open question.

This move is not isolated. On X, influential users like batsoupyum commented that “financial advisors read these studies and keep their allocations low or zero because quantum computing poses an existential threat. It will be like a weight on BTC until the problem is solved.”

The tangible risk: ECDSA vulnerabilities and billions at stake

A recent study by Chaincode Labs quantified what was previously speculation. Between 20% and 50% of currently circulating Bitcoin addresses are vulnerable to future quantum attacks. This represents approximately 6.26 million BTC, with exposure valued between $650 billion and $750 billion.

Risky addresses include legacy Pay-to-Public-Key configurations, certain outdated multisig schemes, and exposed Taproot addresses. The problem lies in the reuse of public keys: each time a key is exposed publicly, it becomes a potential target for a quantum attacker. David Duong from Coinbase identifies two main threats: the direct breaking of ECDSA and the vulnerability of SHA-256, which underpins Bitcoin’s proof-of-work system.

The Projection Calculator visually reflects this progression: as the number of qubits in quantum machines increases—especially following the advances announced by Google in 2025—the likelihood of the existence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC) ceases to be remote.

Divergent institutional responses: no consensus on the magnitude of the risk

Here emerges an interesting pattern. Institutions are not abandoning Bitcoin en masse but are fragmenting their approaches based on different risk assessments. Harvard increased its Bitcoin allocation by nearly 240% during the same period. Morgan Stanley began recommending its wealth management clients allocate up to 4% of their portfolios to crypto assets. Bank of America, for its part, allows exposure ranges between 1% and 4%.

While Wood was retreating, others were betting more heavily. This pattern suggests that the institutional market is not interpreting quantum risk as a binary argument (yes or no), but as an additional risk-return variable in a diversified portfolio. Some consider it unlikely but with very high impact. Others believe the timeframe is sufficient for a solution to be implemented before it causes real damage.

The obstacle of decentralization: how does Bitcoin update its defenses?

Here emerges the deepest technical dilemma. Traditional banks can impose security changes against quantum computing through their hierarchical structure. Bitcoin does not have that luxury. Jamie Coutts, a cryptography commentator on X, expressed it this way: “I used to dismiss the risks of quantum computing for Bitcoin as unlikely. Not anymore. Technically, Bitcoin can be upgraded. But that requires slow, complex coordination in a fully decentralized network. No one can decree: ‘We change now.’”

There is no risk committee, no executive mandate, nor any entity capable of imposing immediate action. Any protective change requires consensus among thousands of nodes, miners, developers, and network participants. That defensive structure, which makes Bitcoin resistant to censorship, paradoxically becomes a bottleneck for defensive evolution.

The post-quantum cryptography standards finalized by NIST in 2024 provide a technical roadmap. However, Charles Hoskinson of Cardano warns that rushing the adoption of these new schemes could severely undermine protocol efficiency. It’s a classic dilemma: security versus performance, in a network where changing the engine while driving is extremely complicated.

The quantum clock accelerates: 2030s or sooner?

DARPA estimated that significant quantum threats could materialize during the 2030s. However, the projections graph of quantum capacity suggests a more compressed horizon. Advances in integrating AI with quantum development could shorten these timelines considerably. What seemed yesterday like a 15-year threat could become a challenge in 5 to 7 years.

This shift in perception of the timeline explains why quantum risk has moved from an academic topic to a real factor in portfolio decisions. It’s no longer a question of if it will happen, but when. And that “when” is moving forward.

Conclusion: quantum computing as a real burden on Bitcoin

The question is no longer whether quantum computing will impact Bitcoin. The impact is already here, manifesting in capital allocations, long-term security debates, and the growing urgency within the ecosystem to explore solutions. Bitcoin’s relative underperformance compared to gold is a symptom, not a cause: it reflects the accumulated weight of a risk that has gone from theoretical speculation to a real investment factor.

Until Bitcoin fully coordinates a quantum-resistant upgrade, that “burden” will remain a constant friction in its narrative as a long-term asset. The network has the technical mechanisms to evolve, but the political, coordinative, and institutional challenge of doing so within a decentralized structure may be greater than the technical challenge itself.