The "full nelson" dilemma of STRE: Why Strategy's European preferred shares are facing liquidity issues

In November 2025, Strategy (MSTR) launched its first offshore perpetual preferred stock product, Stream (STRE), attempting to open the doors to the European capital markets. This product, issued with a face value of €100 and promising an annual interest rate of 10%, was supposed to be the European version of the US Stretch product, paving the way for Strategy’s financing expansion in Europe. However, more than two months after listing, STRE found itself in an awkward “full nelson” dilemma—seemingly tightly controlled by the market and unable to move.

The Paradox of Fundraising Scale and Market Coldness

Strategy ultimately raised $715 million for STRE, which sounds impressive, but the story behind it reveals the market’s true attitude. To attract investors, Strategy was forced to cut the product price by 20% (from an expected €80 to the actual issuance price). This rare concession indicates weak market demand. Even more concerning, since listing, STRE has received almost no official promotion, and the product cannot even be found on Strategy’s own corporate information panel. This “invisible handling” is extremely rare for a financing product.

Liquidity Dilemma: The Root of the “full nelson” Bind

Кхинг Оэй, founder and CEO of Treasury, pointed out the key reason for STRE’s predicament: liquidity. This is not ordinary illiquidity but a structural, multi-dimensional bottleneck.

First, trading channels are severely limited. STRE is only listed on the Luxembourg Euro MTF multilateral trading facility, which is far less user-friendly and has weaker distribution capabilities compared to mainstream brokerages. Especially, the world’s largest online broker, Interactive Brokers, does not offer STRE trading, which is undoubtedly fatal for a product trying to attract European retail investors. Data shows that most trading platforms targeting retail investors do not support this product, making it much harder than expected for investors to buy STRE.

Second, there is a haze around pricing information. Compared to well-covered trading data platforms like TradingView for other products, historical price data for STRE is extremely scarce. According to existing TradingView data, STRE’s market cap is shown as $3.9 billion, but the daily trading volume is only about $1,300—this figure reflects not only low trading activity but also exposes the market’s very low actual participation. Investors cannot effectively assess the product’s liquidity and real performance, and this “unclear” situation further dampens buying interest.

Benchmarking Insights: Why Can Other Products Break Through “full nelson”

A comparison worth noting is Strategy’s US preferred stock product, Stretch (STRC), which has achieved relative success in North America. The reason for STRC’s broader acceptance is that it benefits from wider trading channels, more transparent price discovery mechanisms, and more active market maker support. The same logic applies to the recent market attention on Pudgy Penguins—the NFT project has evolved from a pure digital asset into a multi-dimensional consumer IP precisely because it established a broad user base through mainstream retail channels (toy sales, retail partnerships), rather than relying solely on on-chain trading channels. The PENGU token was widely distributed via airdrops to over 6 million wallets, exemplifying a “multi-access point” strategy that sharply contrasts with STRE.

The Future Dilemma: How Can Strategy Break Through

Оэй suggests that Strategy consider relisting STRE on alternative trading platforms, especially in the Netherlands. Such platforms typically offer broader liquidity supply, more active market makers, narrower bid-ask spreads, and better support for retail investors—all elements that STRE currently severely lacks.

But the real question is whether Strategy will take action. Although Chairman Michael Saylor has been clear about Japan’s market issues—Strategy is not considering issuing preferred stock in Japan—the long-term commitment to the European market remains uncertain. Currently, Strategy has launched four perpetual preferred stock products globally, with the US market dominating. Whether Strategy will “double down” on Europe and invest resources to break the current “full nelson” or continue focusing on the relatively mature US market will be a key test of Saylor’s team’s strategic vision.

Market observers also note that in the crypto asset market, XRP’s recent performance presents an interesting contrast. Despite a decline of about 4% within the month, based on the latest data (January 29, 2026), XRP’s 24-hour trading volume reached $169 million, and the US spot XRP ETF attracted a net inflow of $91.72 million this month—indicating that even during price declines, assets with good liquidity and easy accessibility can still maintain investor interest. This lesson may be precisely what STRE and Strategy need to seriously consider.