How far are we from quantum computers capable of cracking $BTC? Five years, ten years, or even longer? Market analysis indicates that timelines regarding the threat of quantum computing are often exaggerated, prompting calls for a comprehensive shift to post-quantum cryptography. However, the costs and risks of premature migration, as well as the fundamental differences in threats faced by various cryptographic tools, are often overlooked. For encryption, we must deploy post-quantum solutions immediately, no matter the cost, because attacks of 'stealing now, decrypting in the future' already exist. Sensitive data encrypted today will still be valuable decades later, even if quantum computers only emerge then. While post-quantum encryption involves performance degradation and implementation risks, there is no choice for data requiring long-term confidentiality. However, post-quantum digital signatures are a different matter. They are less susceptible to the aforementioned attacks, but their own costs and risks—larger size, performance overhead, immature schemes, potential vulnerabilities—require careful planning rather than immediate action. Distinguishing this is crucial. Misunderstandings can distort cost-benefit analyses, causing teams to overlook more urgent security risks like software vulnerabilities. The real challenge in a successful transition is aligning the urgency of action with the actual threats. Despite some exaggerated claims, the likelihood of 'cryptography-related quantum computers' appearing in the 2020s is extremely low. This refers to fault-tolerant quantum computers capable of running Shor's algorithm to break elliptic curve or RSA encryption within a reasonable timeframe. Based on publicly available technological milestones, we are still very far from such computers. Currently, no quantum computing platform approaches the hundreds of thousands or millions of physical qubits needed to crack RSA-2048 or secp256k1. The bottleneck is not just quantity but also gate fidelity, connectivity between qubits, and the sustained error correction circuits required for deep quantum algorithms. The gap from proof-of-concept to practical cryptanalysis at the necessary scale is enormous. In short, until quantum bits are increased by several orders of magnitude in both number and fidelity, cryptographically relevant quantum computers remain out of reach. Media reports and corporate press releases often cause confusion—for example, conflating 'demonstrations of quantum advantage' or claims of 'thousands of physical qubits' with the ability to attack public key cryptography. There is no publicly supported progress indicating that a quantum computer capable of cracking RSA-2048 or secp256k1 will appear within the next five years. Even ten years remains ambitious. Therefore, excitement about progress and the timeline of 'still needing a decade or more' are not contradictory. The 'steal now, decrypt later' attack applies to encryption but not to digital signatures. Digital signatures do not contain confidential information that needs to be traced back. This makes the transition to post-quantum signatures less urgent than encryption. Mainstream platforms like Chrome and Cloudflare have already deployed hybrid post-quantum security schemes for TLS encryption, but the deployment of post-quantum signatures has been delayed. Zero-knowledge proofs are similar; their 'zero-knowledge' property is inherently post-quantum secure and less susceptible to the attacks mentioned above. Any proofs generated before the advent of quantum computers are considered trustworthy. What does this mean for blockchain? Most blockchains are less vulnerable to such attacks. Non-privacy chains like current $BTC and $ETH primarily use cryptography for transaction authorization via digital signatures, not encryption. This removes immediate cryptographic urgency. However, even authoritative analyses have mistakenly claimed that $BTC is vulnerable, exaggerating the urgency of transition. Of course, reduced urgency does not mean we can be complacent. Currently, privacy-focused chains are an exception. Many encrypt or hide recipient addresses and amounts, which could be stolen now and later de-anonymized. Therefore, if users care about their transactions being exposed by future quantum computers, privacy chains should transition to post-quantum primitives as soon as possible. For $BTC, two practical factors drive the urgency to start planning for post-quantum signatures, both unrelated to quantum technology itself: first, slow governance processes that could lead to disruptive hard forks; second, the need for coin owners to actively migrate their coins, as abandoned or quantum-vulnerable coins cannot be protected. It is estimated that millions of such 'sleeping' and quantum-vulnerable $BTC coins, worth hundreds of billions of dollars, may exist. Quantum threats to $BTC are not an 'overnight' apocalypse but rather a selective, gradual process of target locking. Truly vulnerable coins are those with exposed public keys: early P2PK outputs, reused addresses, and Taproot-held assets. Solutions for abandoned vulnerable coins are complex. A final challenge unique to $BTC is its low transaction throughput; even if migration plans are finalized, migrating all vulnerable funds at current speeds would take months. These challenges mean $BTC must begin planning for post-quantum transition now—not because quantum computers might appear before 2030, but because the governance, coordination, and technical logistics involved in migrating hundreds of billions of dollars will take years. Why should blockchain not rush to deploy post-quantum signatures? We need to understand the performance costs and our confidence that these new schemes will continue to evolve. Post-quantum cryptography mainly relies on five classes of mathematical problems: hash, coding, lattices, multivariate quadratic equations, and elliptic curve isogenies. Hash-based schemes are the most conservative but have the worst performance. For example, NIST standardized hash signatures are at least 7-8KB, whereas current elliptic curve signatures are only 64 bytes. Lattice schemes are the current focus for deployment, but their signatures are 40-70 times larger than current signatures, and their security implementations are more challenging. Historical lessons also advise caution: leading candidates in NIST's standardization process have been broken multiple times by classical computers, illustrating the risks of early standardization and deployment. The internet infrastructure has adopted a cautious approach to signature migration, which is especially important. Blockchain has some unique complexities that make early migration particularly risky—for example, the need for signature aggregation and the ongoing evolution of lattice-based SNARKs. The more pressing issue is implementation security. Over the coming years, implementation vulnerabilities will pose a greater security risk than quantum computers. Based on these realities, the guiding principle is: take quantum threats seriously but do not assume cryptography-related quantum computers will appear before 2030. Meanwhile, some actions can and should be taken now. Immediately deploy hybrid encryption schemes where long-term confidentiality is needed and costs are acceptable. In scenarios tolerant of larger sizes, use hash-based signatures now, such as for software updates and low-frequency applications. Blockchain does not need to rush to implement post-quantum signatures but should start planning immediately. $BTC and other public chains need to define migration paths and policies for 'sleeping' vulnerable funds. Allocate time for mature research on post-quantum SNARKs and aggregatable signatures. Privacy chains should prioritize transitioning to post-quantum primitives if performance permits. In the short term, focus on ensuring implementation security rather than overemphasizing quantum threats. Invest now in audits, fuzzing, and formal verification. Continue funding quantum computing R&D. Rationally assess quantum computing news—treat each milestone as a progress report requiring critical evaluation, not as a signal for rushed action. Following these recommendations can help us avoid more direct risks: implementation vulnerabilities, hasty deployment, and common pitfalls in cryptographic transition. Follow me for more real-time analysis and insights into the crypto market! #GateSquareCreatorSpringIncentive#内容挖矿