US media: The Trump administration is seeking "partners" and views the Iranian Speaker of the Parliament as a "potential power holder"

Ask AI · How do analysts assess the U.S. plan to replace Iran’s leadership?

[By Chen Sijia / Observer Network] The Middle East conflict has entered its fourth week. Despite setbacks for the U.S. and Israel, Iran has shown no signs of backing down. U.S. President Donald Trump has nevertheless started boasting that U.S.-Iran talks are “productive,” and White House officials are also scouting “partners.”

According to a report by U.S. “Politico News” on March 23, the U.S. government is looking for “collaborators” within Iran. Some White House officials believe that Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf is one of the “potential partners,” and could even, with U.S. support, become Iran’s “next leader.”

But analysts believe Iran still has the capability to retaliate the U.S., and that it is unrealistic to even discuss “replacing Iran’s leadership” at this point. Experts on the Iran issue also pointed out that Qalibaf is a representative figure of Iran’s hardliners—one who has long been committed to safeguarding Iran’s national interests and political system—so he is unlikely to make any substantive concessions to the United States.

**“Trump wants to replicate the results in Venezuela”** 

Two anonymous insiders said that the White House plans to conduct “stress tests” on multiple Iranian officials to find “partners” willing to reach an agreement with the U.S. One U.S. government official said the White House has not made any decision yet, but that Qalibaf is a “top candidate.” “He’s one of the priority candidates, but we have to evaluate him—we can’t be hasty.”

The official said Trump is very concerned about oil. He does not want to destroy the key oil export hub of Qaid Haq Island. He hopes to replicate the results the U.S. achieved in Venezuela, so that Iran’s “next leader” can reach an oil agreement with the U.S. After U.S. forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration reached an oil supply agreement with Venezuela’s acting president, Rodríguez.

The insider said: “The key is to back someone like a Rodríguez-type figure in Venezuela, so we can apply pressure and say, ‘We’ll let you stay in power; we won’t remove you. You’ll cooperate with us and give us a favorable agreement—especially when it comes to oil—and we’ll arrange priorities.’”

 

Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly Speaker Qalibaf IC photo 

In addition, insiders said that although some opposition figures have urged the U.S. to support Iran’s Pahlavi dynasty’s “last crown prince,” Reza Pahlavi, the Trump administration does not view Pahlavi as a suitable option because he lacks legitimacy within Iran.

An insider said: “Put Reza Pahlavi in power? Goodness, absolutely not. He grew up abroad—he is the very person who should not be put on the throne. That would only bring chaos.” Another official also said that “Pahlavi is not under consideration.”

Regarding the related rumors, White House press secretary Leavitt responded: “These are sensitive diplomatic discussions. The United States will not conduct negotiations through the media.”

**“The U.S. idea is unrealistic, even somewhat laughable”** 

However, many analysts told Politico News that under the current circumstances, it is too soon to discuss replacing Iran’s leadership, and that the idea is even somewhat laughable.

A person closely connected to the U.S. president’s national security team said: “This is more like showing a posture. If dialogue can be carried out through intermediaries, that’s a good thing; thinking about how to ‘get out of it’ is also a positive signal. But Iran has already proven that even after being hit, they still have the ability to get us stuck in trouble. They can’t easily submit and hand over oil to Trump.”

Another official in the Gulf region who is in contact with the White House said the Trump administration may be trying to exaggerate the progress of negotiations, thereby finding an excuse to postpone the deadlines set earlier.

On the 21st, Trump threatened that if Iran did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz on the 23rd, the U.S. would bomb Iran’s power generation facilities. But on the 23rd local time, Trump again announced on social media that U.S.-Iran talks are “productive,” and said that the strikes on Iran’s power plants will be “delayed by 5 days.”

“He’s definitely stalling for time, trying to stabilize the market,” the Gulf official said. “The bigger problem is that it’s hard to judge whether Trump is seriously looking for a way to get out, or whether he wants to force Iran to refuse by making some unrealistic demands.”

Iran expert Ali Vaez pointed out that Qalibaf is a representative hardliner in Iran—ambitious, highly pragmatic, and committed to safeguarding Iran’s interests—so it is unlikely he would make any substantive concessions to the United States. He added that even if Qalibaf is willing to cooperate, Iran’s military would inevitably limit his actions.

“After the attacks launched by the United States and Israel, Iran’s overall stance is no longer to respond flexibly, but rather deep distrust,” Vaez said. “There is no reason for different sectors in Iran to believe that Trump or Israel would follow any potential agreement.”

**“He is a staunch defender of Iran’s political system”** 

After the assassination and death of Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, many in the public generally believed that Qalibaf, Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly Speaker, who is 64 years old, would play an even more critical role.

Qalibaf was born in 1961 in Torqabe, in the northeastern Iranian Razavi Khorasan Province. After the Iranian Islamic Revolution, he joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. During the Iran-Iraq War, Qalibaf quickly rose through the ranks, serving successively as commander of units including the Imam Reza Brigade, the Nasr Division, and the Karbala Division.

In 1994, Qalibaf was appointed head of the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters under the Revolutionary Guards. In 1997, then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Qalibaf as commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Air Force. In 2000, Qalibaf became commander of Iran’s police force. Iranian media said that while leading the law enforcement sector, Qalibaf implemented reform measures and promoted modernization of police equipment.

Besides having extensive military experience, Qalibaf also has more than 20 years of experience in politics. In 2005, Qalibaf stepped down from the military and ran in Iran’s presidential election, but lost. In September 2005, Qalibaf was elected mayor of Tehran, taking over after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who left office after being elected president, and served until he stepped down in August 2017.

Since then, Qalibaf has run for president multiple times, but has not won. In 2020, Qalibaf was elected a member of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly and became its speaker, becoming one of the core figures in Iranian politics.

Public information shows that the Islamic Consultative Assembly is Iran’s highest legislative body and operates as a unicameral system. Laws passed by the assembly must be approved by Iran’s Guardian Council in order to take effect, and they cannot make laws that violate Iran’s official religious or constitutional principles. The Islamic Consultative Assembly has 290 members, elected directly by voters for a term of 4 years, but candidate eligibility must be approved by the Guardian Council.

The Islamic Consultative Assembly has a presidium and 12 specialized committees. The presidium consists of 12 people in total—the speaker, two deputy speakers, three executive officers, and six secretaries. Their term is 1 year, and after the term ends, members are re-elected by a vote of the legislators, with the possibility of serving consecutive terms.

Beyond the assembly, Iran also has a Guardian Council composed of 12 people. The 12 include 6 jurists appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, and 6 ordinary jurists selected by the head of the judiciary, recommended to the assembly, and appointed after being approved by a vote of the assembly. The council can review and confirm bills passed by the assembly, ruling on whether they conflict with Islamic doctrine and the Constitution; if there is any conflict, the bills are sent back to the assembly for further review and modification. If the Guardian Council and the assembly disagree over a bill and it is difficult to reconcile, it is arbitrated by the Expediency Discernment Council.

The UAE’s Gulf News said that although Qalibaf has significant influence in both Iran’s political circles and the military, how much political power the speaker of the assembly actually has remains unknown. Even before the war began, Iran’s political system had already shown “decentralization,” with the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, and senior religious institutions all having decision-making power.

Not only that, Qalibaf has consistently defended Iran’s political system. Since the United States and Israel launched military strikes, Qalibaf has also made several tough statements. Last week, he said that the enemy’s attacks on Iran’s infrastructure are “no different from suicide.” Iran has established the principle of “an eye for an eye,” and that a new stage of the conflict has already begun.

On the 23rd, Trump announced that the U.S. would “delay by 5 days” its strikes on Iran’s power plants, hinting that it would engage with “very reliable” figures inside Iran.

Iran’s side denied any direct or indirect contact with the United States, and Qalibaf also denied dialogue with the United States. He said the reports about negotiations were “fake information,” intended to manipulate financial and oil markets so that the United States and Israel could get out of the current “predicament.” He emphasized that officials at all levels in Iran will firmly support the Supreme Leader and the people until the stated goals are achieved.

**This article is an Observer Network exclusive. Without authorization, it may not be reproduced.**