Futures
Access hundreds of perpetual contracts
TradFi
Gold
One platform for global traditional assets
Options
Hot
Trade European-style vanilla options
Unified Account
Maximize your capital efficiency
Demo Trading
Introduction to Futures Trading
Learn the basics of futures trading
Futures Events
Join events to earn rewards
Demo Trading
Use virtual funds to practice risk-free trading
Launch
CandyDrop
Collect candies to earn airdrops
Launchpool
Quick staking, earn potential new tokens
HODLer Airdrop
Hold GT and get massive airdrops for free
Launchpad
Be early to the next big token project
Alpha Points
Trade on-chain assets and earn airdrops
Futures Points
Earn futures points and claim airdrop rewards
IPO Radar | Jiadeli's 146 million yuan funding remains a mystery, with conflicting capacity data
Ask AI · What are the reasons behind multiple versions of the company’s production capacity data?
After successfully passing the review, J&D Lijida was only one step away from listing on the A-share market. The company, which specializes in ultra-thin BOPP (biaxially oriented polypropylene) electrical films, has drawn a picture of rapid growth for the market: in 2024, it ranked second globally in market share and first domestically; in 2025, fixed assets exceeded 600 million yuan, construction in progress reached 344 million yuan, and production capacity continued to rise year by year.
However, after Jiemian News cross-referenced J&D Lijida’s financial data over the past three years, bidding notices from its subsidiaries, and compared them with the company’s customers’ publicly available information and industry peers’ updates, it found that behind this development narrative, there are many “abnormal signals.”
Industry peers reduce production capacity, while J&D Lijida expands against the trend
In 2024, J&D Lijida’s revenue and net profit increased year over year by 38.95% and 68.99%, respectively, showing strong momentum. But in 2025, this high-growth trajectory came to an abrupt halt—revenue growth fell to 3.18%, and net profit growth slipped to 2.35%.
“A manufacturing company’s performance growth is usually relatively stable. This kind of ‘big ups and downs’ trajectory is especially striking at key IPO moments.” A banking analyst who has long followed the new materials industry told Jiemian News, “When considering the industry cycle, demand in the 2025 new energy sector did not drop significantly. J&D Lijida’s growth slowed sharply, and that is worth investigating.”
Compared with the slowdown in growth, what is even more worth investigating is J&D Lijida’s decision to expand capacity.
From a global perspective, Japanese companies represented by Toray are industry leaders. Toray is number one globally in ultra-thin film production technology for new-energy vehicles. Its products have clear advantages in core metrics such as ultra-thinness and pressure-resistance. The products mainly supply Japanese companies such as Panasonic and Nichicon, with very few entering the Chinese market. Toray currently has 4 production lines—only in 2023 did it announce a 40% capacity expansion (production in 2025), and there is no further capacity expansion plan in the future.
For European companies, firms such as Germany’s Crespo and Twy High have decades of production experience. Their equipment and raw material procurement channels are similar to J&D Lijida’s (equipment mostly from Bruckner, raw materials from Nordic industries), and they have some competitiveness in thin-film and ultra-thin-film fields. However, in recent years, due to Europe’s high electricity costs, their competitiveness has continued to weaken. Among them, Germany’s Crespo currently has 3 production lines; it has recently applied for bankruptcy, and its future capacity may shrink further.
Among domestic peers, Tongfeng Electronics, which started the earliest, currently has 8 production lines and has no capacity expansion plans after 2025. Another peer, Datongnan, has also not disclosed any capacity expansion plan recently.
Image source: Prospectus
“Since peers are not expanding capacity, the core reason is that downstream demand pressure is large. Expanding blindly would only worsen overcapacity and squeeze profit margins.” A new materials industry analyst said in an interview.
In sharp contrast to the industry’s contraction is J&D Lijida’s “aggressive capacity expansion.” J&D Lijida has already put into operation 8 production lines, and it is currently in a concentrated phase of capacity commissioning. Not only are production lines No. 7 and No. 8 in operation with assets already capitalized, but it also has production lines No. 9 and No. 10 under construction, as well as the Xiamen new materials production base (Phase I) project. There are even capacity expansion projects for production lines No. 1 and No. 2 that have not been disclosed in the prospectus. The pace of expansion is frequent and high-profile.
According to the prospectus, the projects for production lines No. 9 and No. 10 and the Xiamen new materials production base (Phase I) are expected to add 7,500 tons of capacity. The expansion projects for production lines No. 1 and No. 2 are planned to add 2,700 tons of capacity. Combined, they will reach 10,000 tons, while J&D Lijida’s existing orders are only a bit over 1,100 tons.
Image source: Environmental impact assessment approval announcement
True production capacity remains a mystery
J&D Lijida’s capacity-expansion picture looks impressive, but after diving into its capacity data and the dynamics of its production lines, many contradictions emerge.
First, look at the “mismatch” between production capacity and assets. In 2024, J&D Lijida’s standardized production capacity increased from 12,900 tons to 17,900 tons, a rise of 39%. For a manufacturing company, this increase is significant. But strangely, that same year, the company’s fixed assets were 341 million yuan, construction in progress was 78 million yuan, with no significant increase compared with 2023—there are no signs of any new production lines being commissioned.
In response, J&D Lijida explained that “production lines No. 5 and No. 6 were commissioned and capitalized in July 2023 and December 2023, respectively, with total newly added effective capacity of about 6,000 tons, the growth rate of machinery and equipment was 59.02%, and the rate of newness improved in tandem.” In other words, the capacity growth in 2024 came from capacity release from production lines that were capitalized in 2023.
Image source: Prospectus
By 2025, the situation reversed. In this year, J&D Lijida’s fixed assets surged from 341 million yuan to 620 million yuan, an increase of 82%; construction in progress rose from 78 million yuan to 344 million yuan, an increase of 341%. The company said the newly added fixed assets mainly came from capitalizing the ultra-thin BOPP projects of production lines No. 7 and No. 8, which appears to be a signal of a major capacity expansion. But in 2025, its standardized production capacity increased only from 17,900 tons to 19,800 tons, an increase of merely 10.6%, creating a huge “mismatch” compared with the asset increase.
J&D Lijida explained that “in 2024 and in the first six months of 2025, there were no new production lines; the growth rate declined. Production line No. 7 was commissioned in September 2025, and production line No. 8 was commissioned in December 2025, so 2025 capacity had not been fully realized.” Under this claim, capacity in 2026 should rise significantly. However, given the industry’s demand pressure, whether the新增 capacity can be absorbed is itself a major question. Currently, J&D Lijida’s outstanding orders are only 1,147.58 tons. Even if capacity utilization reaches 100%, the pressure to absorb the additional 10,000 tons of capacity remains prominent.
More notably, in different public materials, J&D Lijida’s capacity data for production lines No. 7 and No. 8 appear in three distinctly different versions. According to the environmental impact assessment report form published by J&D Lijida in December 2024, this project adds two production lines, with an annual additional output of 3,200 tons. In the company’s first-round inquiry response, the effective capacity of production lines No. 7 and No. 8 totals 5,807.38 tons, which is 81% higher than the environmental impact assessment report. In another place in the first-round inquiry response and in the second-round inquiry response, the company disclosed that two production lines reach a production-ready capacity totaling 4,000 tons, which does not match either of the first two figures.
Image source: Xunbiao Bao
Image source: Prospectus
Image source: Prospectus
Based on J&D Lijida’s explanation, one may infer that the capacity added in 2025 is only 1,200 tons because production lines No. 7 and No. 8 are commissioned in the second half of the year. Then, after the capacity of production lines No. 7 and No. 8 ramps up, there will still be 2,000 to 4,000 tons of capacity that needs to be absorbed.
“The difference in capacity figures for the same project is so large, yet the company has not provided a reasonable explanation in multiple rounds of inquiries, nor has it clarified differences in statistical methodologies. That inevitably makes people doubt the authenticity of its capacity data.” A partner at an accounting firm who declined to be named told Jiemian News.
With multiple production lines under construction at the same time, the capacity confusion becomes even worse. All of this traces back to J&D Lijida’s only wholly-owned subsidiary—Xiamen J&D Lijida New Materials Co., Ltd. According to Tianyancha, at the end of 2023, this subsidiary purchased a piece of industrial land of 5.88 hectares in Haicang District, Xiamen. In January 2024, the subsidiary issued a high-profile bidding notice for “J&D Lijida’s newly built 9 and 10 ultra-thin BOPP new material production lines.” In June of the same year, it immediately followed with the announcement of “newly built J&D Lijida Xiamen new materials production base.”
Image source: Tianyancha app
But strangely, this high-profile capacity expansion plan was not reflected in J&D Lijida’s financial disclosure in a timely manner. It was not until 2025 that, in the company’s construction in progress details, “J&D Lijida’s newly built Xiamen new materials production base (Phase I)” first appeared. This base contains the previously high-profile bid-commissioned production lines No. 9 and No. 10.
Even more puzzling is that the bidding, environmental impact assessment, and construction-in-progress disclosure timelines for production lines No. 7 and No. 8 are completely disconnected from those for production lines No. 9 and No. 10. Public information shows that J&D Lijida did not start the bidding work for the production-line No. 7 and No. 8 ultra-thin BOPP new material production line project until August 2024. After two rounds of environmental impact assessment public notices, the project only formally received approval and public notification of its environmental impact assessment on January 16, 2025. But in the construction-in-progress details disclosed at the end of 2024, J&D Lijida had already disclosed that the balance on the books for the production lines No. 7 and No. 8 was 25.59 million yuan.
“According to the conventional process of environmental protection approvals, before a project completes the environmental impact assessment approval and obtains the environmental impact assessment approval document, in theory it should not enter the substantive construction stage.” An industry insider who has long worked on environmental protection approval consulting said directly in an interview with Jiemian News.
Image source: Xunbiao Bao
Jiemian News noticed that in J&D Lijida’s 2025 balance sheet, the parent company’s “other payables” totaled as much as 147 million yuan, while in the consolidated financial statements it was only 1 million yuan (0.01 billion). This means that internal funds transactions of about 146 million yuan occurred between the parent company and its subsidiaries. The company did not provide a clear explanation of the specific flow and use of this funding.
Timing choices and “data conflicts”
In addition, the capitalization timing of J&D Lijida’s headquarters building has also drawn market attention.
Image source: Prospectus
Image source: Prospectus
In the “review draft” of J&D Lijida’s prospectus (with data cut off as of June 30, 2025), the budget amount for the headquarters building project was 49.13 million yuan; the company had cumulatively invested 45.60 million yuan, with an investment progress of 90%. The expected time to reach a usable state was November 2025.
But in the “registration draft” of J&D Lijida’s prospectus (data updated to December 30, 2025), the cumulative investment amount for the headquarters building increased slightly to 45.96 million yuan—over half a year, the investment only increased by 0.36 million yuan. Meanwhile, the expected time to put into use was pushed back from November 2025 to January 2026. In addition, the registration draft also added an item called “other miscellaneous projects,” amounting to 3.395 million yuan.
Image source: Prospectus
Why was the completion time delayed? What are “other miscellaneous projects”? J&D Lijida did not explain.
J&D Lijida’s issues are not limited to this. There are also “data conflicts” between customer data within the prospectus.
As Eagle Peak Electronics is J&D Lijida’s main customer, the transaction data between the two should match. Jiemian News’ reporter noted that in J&D Lijida’s disclosed accounts receivable details for 2023, the accounts receivable balance from Eagle Peak Electronics was 12.4613 million yuan. This means that in 2023, J&D Lijida had a receivable from Eagle Peak Electronics of 12.4613 million yuan, corresponding to 12.4613 million yuan that Eagle Peak Electronics should pay to J&D Lijida. But in Eagle Peak Electronics’ publicly disclosed list of the top five accounts payable customers for 2023, the amount payable to the largest customer was 9.10 million yuan, and J&D Lijida did not appear among its top five accounts payable customers.
Regarding the above issues, Jiemian News contacted J&D Lijida for an interview. As of the time of publication, the company had not responded.