"Little Horse" stalls, how can FAW continue to "gallop"?

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（Source: 21st Century Business Herald）

21st Century Business Herald Reporter He Xuyang

2026 Model Yueyi 03

As March begins, new car sales data for February are gradually released. One model’s market performance stands out: FAW Bestune Little Horse only sold 1,493 units, a sharp year-over-year decline of 80%. This marks the fourth consecutive month of YoY sales decline for Little Horse, and the third month of significant drops. In December last year, sales plummeted 51.8% YoY; in January this year, the decline widened to 76.7%, and in February, it exceeded 80%.

Looking back to 2025, FAW Bestune delivered its most impressive sales performance in 20 years—total annual sales surpassed 200,017 units, setting a new high for the brand over two decades. Its YoY growth led among domestic brands. Among these, only Bestune Little Horse exceeded 110,000 units for the year, with peak monthly sales reaching 14,688 units, consistently ranking in the top three in its segment for several months. It not only supported over 60% of Bestune’s total sales but also earned a valuable “entry ticket” into the new energy track.

However, this bright data masked a “specialization” problem: Little Horse accounted for 65% of FAW Bestune’s total sales in 2025, with a price range of only 24,900 to 53,900 yuan. The extremely low profit margins of microcars meant Little Horse could only pursue scale, unable to sustain profitable growth for the brand.

Over-reliance on Little Horse caused Bestune’s brand image to continue deteriorating. Once, FAW Bestune was a mid-to-high-end自主品牌 under China FAW, with its first model, Bestune B70, backed by Mazda 6 technology, establishing itself in the mid-size自主车市场, competing on equal footing with Geely, Changan, and Chery. But with the hot sales of Little Horse, the brand’s image became associated with “low-cost, entry-level cars under 30,000 yuan,” hindering efforts to elevate the brand. This became a major obstacle for the Yueyi series, which aimed to target mainstream family markets.

FAW Bestune realized the risks of relying on a single model. In March 2025, it officially launched the new energy series “Yueyi.” In its strategic plan, the Yueyi series was meant to help the brand shed dependence on low-end models, penetrate the mainstream new energy market, and achieve brand elevation. But after a year, Yueyi’s market performance fell far short of expectations. In 2025, Yueyi 03’s total sales were only 28,600 units, averaging less than 3,000 per month; in 2026, sales sharply declined, with January at 1,544 units and February halving to 741 units. The plug-in hybrid Yueyi 07, over eight months in 2025, averaged fewer than 500 units per month; in the first two months of 2026, sales were just 227 and 170 units respectively.

The failure of Yueyi’s breakout was not accidental but the result of multiple shortcomings in product strength, brand power, and market positioning. Yueyi 03, priced in the 100,000-yuan segment, competes in China’s most competitive new energy SUV niche, with benchmark models like BYD Yuan PLUS and Sea Lion 05 dominating the market, and emerging players like Xiaopeng Mona and Leapmotor B-level models crowding in. For young family consumers—the core demographic for 100,000-yuan family cars—Yueyi 03 lacks BYD’s technological reputation and the market presence of Geely and Changan, making it hard to persuade consumers to abandon established competitors and choose Bestune.

As the “Little Horse myth” fades, FAW Bestune must face a core question: after the prosperity driven by low-cost microcars, how can the brand achieve genuine, sustainable “Bestune” growth in the fiercely competitive new energy market?

FAW Bestune must address its core technological weaknesses—either commit to independent R&D or deeply partner with leading collaborators to establish its own technological identity. In the new energy era, core technology is the foundation of a brand. BYD has achieved technological breakthroughs with blade batteries and the e-platform; Geely and Changan have developed their own electric drive and intelligent driving systems through self-research. Another example is GAC’s deep collaboration with Huawei, integrating top-tier intelligent technology with vehicle manufacturing to create core product competitiveness. On March 11, 2026, Yueyi 03 was launched, emphasizing “large space, long range, and quality from top manufacturers,” but compared to competitors, it lacks memorable features and uniqueness, making it difficult to break user choice barriers even if it offers cost advantages.

Brand image also needs a reset. Currently, Bestune’s brand image is heavily tied to Little Horse, which is the biggest obstacle to upward brand movement. To break into mainstream markets, Bestune must redefine its brand positioning, abandon short-term sales boosts through low prices, and upgrade its technology, products, and services comprehensively. This will rebuild a brand perception of “reliable, high-quality, family-oriented.” The brand should leverage FAW’s 70 years of automotive heritage and state-owned enterprise quality to translate into tangible product value and service experience for consumers.

When the “Little Horse” sales bubble bursts, FAW Bestune finally faces the reality: prosperity driven by low-cost microcars is not enough. Only by establishing a foothold in the mainstream new energy market can it achieve true, sustained “Bestune” growth. By 2026, China’s auto market has entered a red ocean of fierce competition, and FAW Bestune’s uphill battle is running out of time.