"Little Horse" stalls, how can FAW continue to "gallop"?

21st Century Business Herald Reporter He Xuyang

2026 Yueyi 03

As March begins, the February new car sales data is gradually being released. One model’s market performance stands out: FAW Bestune Xiaoma only sold 1,493 units, a significant year-over-year decline of 80%. This marks the fourth consecutive month of YoY sales decline for Xiaoma, and the third consecutive month of sharp drops. In December last year, Xiaoma’s sales fell 51.8% YoY, and in January this year, the decline widened further to 76.7%, with February’s drop exceeding 80%.

Looking back to 2025, FAW Bestune delivered its most impressive sales performance in 20 years—total annual sales exceeded 200,017 units, setting a new high for the brand over two decades. Its YoY growth led among domestic brands. Among these, only Bestune Xiaoma surpassed 110,000 units in annual sales, with peak monthly sales reaching 14,688 units. It consistently ranked among the top three in its segment for several months, not only supporting over 60% of Bestune’s total sales but also earning a valuable “ticket” into the new energy market.

However, this bright data masked a “specialization” dilemma: Xiaoma accounted for as much as 65% of FAW Bestune’s total sales in 2025, with a price range of only 24,900 to 53,900 yuan. The extremely low profit margins of microcars meant Xiaoma could only pursue scale, unable to sustain profitable growth for the brand.

Over-reliance on Xiaoma has led to a continuous decline in Bestune’s brand image. Once, FAW Bestune was a mid-to-high-end independent brand under FAW Group, with its first model, the Bestune B70, backed by Mazda 6 technology, establishing a foothold in the mid-size domestic car market. It once stood shoulder to shoulder with Geely, Changan, and Chery. But with the hot sales of Xiaoma, the brand’s image became associated with “low-cost, entry-level cars under 30,000 yuan,” which hindered efforts to elevate the brand. This perception became a major obstacle for the brand’s upward movement, and the introduction of Yueyi into the mainstream family market became another challenge.

FAW Bestune realized the risks of relying on a single model. In March 2025, it officially launched the new energy series “Yueyi.” According to its strategic plan, the Yueyi series was meant to help the brand break free from dependence on low-end models, enter the mainstream new energy market, and achieve brand elevation. But after a year, Yueyi’s market performance was far below expectations. In 2025, Yueyi 03’s total sales were only 28,600 units, averaging less than 3,000 per month; in 2026, sales plummeted further, with January at 1,544 units and February halving to 741 units. The plug-in hybrid Yueyi 07, which targeted the market, averaged fewer than 500 units over eight months in 2025, with only 227 and 170 units sold in the first two months of 2026.

The failure of Yueyi’s breakout was not accidental but the result of multiple shortcomings in product strength, brand image, and market positioning. Yueyi 03 operates in the highly competitive 100,000-yuan pure electric family SUV segment, dominated by benchmark models like BYD Yuan PLUS and Sea Lion 05, with new entrants like XPeng Mona and Leapmotor B-level models crowding the market. For young family consumers—the core demographic for 100,000-yuan family cars—Yueyi 03 lacks BYD’s technological reputation and the market presence of Geely and Changan, making it difficult to persuade consumers to abandon mature competitors for Bestune.

As the “Xiaoma myth” fades, FAW Bestune must confront a core issue: after the prosperity driven by low-cost microcars, how can the brand achieve genuine, sustainable “Bestune” growth in the fiercely competitive new energy market?

FAW Bestune must address its core technological weaknesses—either commit to independent R&D or deeply collaborate with leading partners to establish its own technological identity. In the new energy era, core technology is fundamental to a brand’s survival. BYD has achieved technological breakthroughs with blade batteries and the e-platform; Geely and Changan have developed their own electric drive and intelligent driving systems through self-research. Another example is GAC’s deep collaboration with Huawei, integrating top-tier intelligent technology with vehicle manufacturing to create core product competitiveness. On March 11, 2026, the Yueyi 03 was launched, emphasizing “large space, long range, and quality from top manufacturers,” but compared to competitors, it lacks memorable features and uniqueness, making it difficult to break user choice barriers even if it offers cost advantages.

Brand image also needs a reset. Currently, Bestune’s brand image is heavily tied to Xiaoma, which is the biggest obstacle to upward growth. To break into the mainstream market, Bestune must redefine its brand positioning, abandon short-term thinking focused on low prices and sales volume, and upgrade its technology, products, and services to rebuild a perception of “reliable, high-quality, family-oriented.” The brand should leverage FAW’s 70 years of automotive heritage and state-owned enterprise quality to translate into tangible product value and service experience for consumers.

When the “Xiaoma” sales bubble bursts, FAW Bestune will finally face the reality. For this 20-year-old independent brand, prosperity driven by low-cost microcars is not enough. Only by establishing a solid foothold in the mainstream new energy market can it achieve genuine, sustained “Bestune” growth. By 2026, China’s auto market has entered a red ocean competition stage, and FAW Bestune’s uphill battle is running out of time.