2025 Projected Loss Exceeds 10 Billion, Sales Only 3 Billion, China Jin地 Group Traps Insurance Funds

Since 2021, the real estate market has experienced dramatic changes, and a new competitive landscape is accelerating formation.

When the “Three Red Lines” policy was announced at the end of August 2020, only five of the top 30 property developers were in the “green zone.” According to Huachuang Securities, these five developers were Poly Developments, China Overseas Land & Investment, China Resources Land, Gemdale Corporation, and China Merchants Shekou.

Just five years later, the fates of these developers have begun to diverge: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with financing and credit advantages are expanding against the trend and securing top positions; meanwhile, Gemdale Group, which lost its “safety cushion,” has quickly fallen behind under the dual pressures of deleveraging and declining sales.

CRIC data shows that by the end of 2025, Poly Developments, China Overseas Land, China Resources Land, and China Merchants Shekou will all rank in the industry’s top five. Only Gemdale Group, with a sales scale of just 30 billion yuan, remains outside the top 20.

As a former member of the “Big Four” alongside “Zhao Bao Wan Jin” (招商蛇口, Poly Developments, China Resources Land, and Vanke), can Gemdale Group still make it into the top tier of property developers in the future?

1

Sales keep declining,

2025 scale will only be 30 billion yuan

Gemdale Group is actually an established real estate company.

In 1988, Shenzhen Shangbu District Industrial Village Construction Service Company was officially established, mainly responsible for unified development and construction of Shenzhen Shangbu District’s industrial villages. Later, the company was renamed Gemdale Industrial Development Corporation, and in 1993, it began engaging in real estate business as a state-owned enterprise affiliated with Futian District, Shenzhen.

Three years later (1996), based on the original Gemdale Industrial Development Corporation, the company was reorganized and renamed Gemdale Group. At that time, the Shenzhen Futian District State-owned Assets Management Bureau was the largest shareholder, holding 49%.

Subsequently, the Shenzhen Futian District State-owned Assets Management Bureau transferred all its shares in Gemdale Group to its subordinate company, Shenzhen Futian Investment Development Company (now renamed Shenzhen Futian Investment Holding Co., Ltd., hereafter: Futian Investment). Currently, Futian Investment remains the second-largest shareholder of Gemdale Group.

With state backing, Gemdale Group once ranked alongside China Merchants Shekou, Poly Developments, and Vanke as the “Big Four” of the real estate market, known as “Zhao Bao Wan Jin,” a fierce competitor.

Over more than 30 years of turbulent real estate development, developers have experienced wild growth, rapid acceleration, and brutal “reshuffling.” During this period, Gemdale Group has had moments of “falling behind” as well as high points— in 2021, its sales reached 286.71 billion yuan, ranking 11th in CRIC’s industry list; in 2022, it again entered the top 10 alongside “Zhao Bao Wan.”

Since then, Gemdale Group has turned downward, with sales plummeting. In 2024, its contracted sales fell below 100 billion yuan, down to 68.51 billion yuan, a sharp halving from 153.55 billion yuan in 2023.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Announcement]

On one side, the pressure of deleveraging under heavy debt; on the other, sluggish sales. Under this double squeeze, Gemdale Group has suspended land acquisitions from the open market since June 2023, only resuming in 2025 with replenishments in Hangzhou, Shanghai, and other cities.

At the 2024 earnings conference, Chairman Xu Jiajun stated that the main reason for returning to land auctions was the easing of debt pressure as the company repaid its public debt. Additionally, the relaxed industry policies in 2024 helped restore overall market confidence and demand, with signs of recovery in some core cities, prompting the company to restart land acquisitions in key markets.

Gemdale Group is trying to regroup and get back on track, but reality has been less than ideal. In 2025, its contracted sales plummeted 56.18% year-on-year to only 30.02 billion yuan, nearly one-tenth of its peak in 2021.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Announcement]

According to CRIC and Centaline data, Gemdale’s contracted sales in 2025 even lag behind struggling Country Garden by 10.2 billion yuan, dropping to 23rd in industry ranking.

Entering 2026, Gemdale’s start has been difficult. In February 2026, the company’s contracted sales amounted to 630 million yuan, down 77.50% year-on-year; in the first two months, total contracted sales reached 1.85 billion yuan, down 63.37%.

Why is Gemdale Group’s sales so sluggish? Is it due to land reserve layout, or are there strategic issues? How are the projects replenished since 2025 being disposed of? Are there specific measures to boost sales and accelerate destocking?

We attempted to contact Gemdale Group for insights, but as of press time, no response has been received.

2

Pre-loss exceeds 10 billion,

Ling Ke leaves ahead of schedule

The “hidden pain” caused by sluggish sales is gradually surfacing in Gemdale Group’s financial reports.

On January 23, this year, Gemdale Group disclosed a forecast for 2025—expecting a net loss attributable to parent company of 11.1 to 13.5 billion yuan, with a non-recurring net loss of 10 to 12.4 billion yuan.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Announcement]

Compared to the 6.1 billion yuan net loss and 4.4 billion yuan non-recurring net loss in 2024, the 2025 losses have doubled, setting a record high since the company’s listing in 2001.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Financial Report]

Gemdale explained that the profit decline is due to recent decreases in sales scale, reduced project turnover area, and lower operating income. The company also adjusted its operational and sales strategies dynamically based on market conditions, increasing destocking efforts, which led to some inventories being valued below cost, prompting provisions for inventory impairment and credit losses based on prudence.

Before turning into losses, management turbulence had already begun.

On the evening of October 16, 2023, Gemdale announced that Ling Ke resigned from the positions of director, chairman, and member of the strategic committee due to health reasons.

Ling Ke, who previously served as head of the Shenzhen Futian Foreign Trade Department, had been chairman of Gemdale for 25 years. Like Lei Jun at Xiaomi or Wang Jianlin at Wanda, Ling Ke was considered the “soul figure” of Gemdale.

His departure caused a stir. The next day (October 17), Gemdale’s stock opened lower and hit the daily limit down, with multiple domestic bonds also falling sharply, some by over 20%. The company quickly issued an emergency statement reiterating that Ling Ke’s resignation was due to “health reasons” and that operations remained normal.

Soon after, the largest shareholder, Fude Life Insurance, and the second-largest shareholder, Futian Investment, sent representatives to take control of Gemdale Group. In March 2024, former secretary of Gemdale, Xu Jiajun, was elected as the new chairman, with Ji Tong from Futian Investment serving as vice chairman.

The following month (April 2024), Fude Life’s Xu Wenyuan, Xu Qian, and Li Ronghui officially joined the board as non-independent directors. Veteran Huang Juncan, once seen as Ling Ke’s successor, stepped down as CEO, and Wei Chuanjun resigned as CFO, both replaced by Li Ronghui.

On the last day of 2025, Gemdale announced that Ji Tong resigned from the positions of director and vice chairman due to work changes, and would no longer hold any company positions. In January 2026, Yang Yuqiu, chairman of Futian Investment, joined Gemdale’s board.

Objectively, the new management team may have more seasoned experience, but their familiarity with the real estate industry may not match that of long-time veterans like Ling Ke or Huang Juncan. Data shows that since 2024, Gemdale has not escaped losses, with cumulative net losses attributable to parent exceeding 17 billion yuan over two years.

How will the new management team, formed two years ago, address this massive loss? Who should be responsible? Is there a timeline for turning losses around? If losses persist long-term, will cash flow pressures worsen? We attempted to get insights from Gemdale Group but have yet to receive a response.

3

Insurance funds “trapped,” capital gap exceeds 13 billion

During the peak of the real estate boom, Gemdale Group was also highly favored by capital.

Between 2013 and 2014, Fude Life Insurance, Anbang Insurance, and its subsidiary Anbang Life (collectively “Dajia Group”) repeatedly increased their holdings of Gemdale shares in the secondary market, vying for influence.

According to incomplete statistics by “Bullet Finance,” from January 2013 to May 2014, Fude Life Insurance bought at least 1.135 billion shares of Gemdale, costing about 8.4 billion yuan.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Announcement]

From December 2013 to December 2014, Anbang Insurance and Anbang Life (later part of “Dajia Group”) increased their holdings by over 600 million shares, with average prices generally above 6 yuan per share.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Announcement]

By the end of 2014, Fude Life Insurance and Dajia Group held 29.99% and 20% of Gemdale respectively, becoming the top two shareholders, surpassing founder Futian Investment.

However, the keen Dajia Group quickly withdrew as the market began to decline. Starting in 2021, Dajia Group began frequent disposals, gradually exiting the top ten shareholders of Gemdale.

There were also rumors that Fude Life Insurance planned to transfer its Gemdale shares. Shortly after Ling Ke’s resignation as chairman in October 2023, reports circulated that Fude Life intended to sell its stake for 6 billion yuan to Shenzhen Investment Holdings, but Shenzhen Investment quickly issued a statement denying the rumor and reported it to authorities.

Now, Fude Life Insurance is “trapped.” As of the third quarter of 2025, it held 1.347 billion shares of Gemdale, valued at about 4 billion yuan based on the March 20, 2026 closing price of 2.95 yuan per share. Compared to the over 8 billion yuan spent in 2013-2014, this is a huge loss.

Notably, after the two major insurers entered, Gemdale’s dividend payout ratio surged sharply, sharing in the real estate dividends.

Wind data shows that from 2015 to 2021, Gemdale paid out about 19.2 billion yuan in dividends, with annual payout ratios exceeding 30%. Before 2015, the payout ratio never exceeded 20%.

[Figure / Wind]

However, after long periods of high dividends and the peak debt repayment phase, cash flow safety has been squeezed.

In December 2023, Gemdale transferred a 51% stake in Shenzhen Gemdale Xinsa Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. to Futian Investment, raising 3.251 billion yuan.

But this is only a drop in the bucket. As of the third quarter of 2025, Gemdale’s cash and cash equivalents stood at 14.34 billion yuan, with short-term loans of 426 million yuan and non-current liabilities due within one year totaling 27.858 billion yuan. Short-term debt totaled approximately 28.284 billion yuan. Roughly estimating, the company’s short-term funding gap is about 13.9 billion yuan.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Financial Report]

Moreover, Gemdale is losing its “self-sustaining” ability. In the first three quarters of 2025, its operating cash flow was negative 1.468 billion yuan, directly turning from positive to negative. In the current environment where “cash flow preservation” is key, the company’s capital chain pressure is evident.

[Figure / Gemdale Group Financial Report]

Looking back, after falling behind, Gemdale briefly re-entered the top 10 industry rankings, then again faced sharp declines in sales and profits. This time, the responsibility to steer Gemdale back on track has shifted from Ling Ke to Xu Jiajun.

*The main image is from Gemdale Group’s official website.