Hong Kong stablecoins have finally taken their first step, but the real competition is just beginning.

By Charlie, Little Sun

The article is the author’s personal opinions and does not represent the positions of any related companies.

Over the past year, although I have been in the U.S., I have also been deeply involved in this round of Hong Kong’s stablecoin process: advising an applicant institution, and as a result, I was interviewed by Nikkei.

Over the past few months, I have read many commentaries and analyses, spoken with many people, and also written several of my own judgments.

Last week, the first batch of licenses finally landed. With everything settled, of course I’m left with mixed feelings.

No matter what the outcome is, at least this first step has finally been taken.

1. With the first batch of licenses landing, Hong Kong’s first priority is “trustworthy issuance”

For a place like Hong Kong—where people are accustomed to thinking through risks first and then letting the market grow gradually—the fact that the first step can be put in place is, in itself, more important than many beautiful narratives.

However, the first step has never equaled a complete answer.

On April 10, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority officially issued the first stablecoin issuer licenses to Standard Chartered, led by Anchorpoint Financial, and Hong Kong Shanghai Banking HSBC.

There were 36 applications in the first batch in total, but in the end only 2 were approved.

The standards provided by the HKMA are also very clear: risk control and compliance capability, a feasible business plan, clear use cases, and the principle of “similar activities, similar risks, similar regulation.”

This set of results may not excite the market the most, but it almost perfectly reflects Hong Kong’s institutional style.

Many people treat stablecoins as a trendier wallet product, or a more lively Web3 theme.

But after engaging with HKMA, it becomes clear that the regulator doesn’t look at it in such a romantic way.

In the regulator’s view, stablecoins are first and foremost a new type of liability instrument. Behind them are reserves, redemptions, anti-money laundering, payments, clearing, and consumer protection.

And precisely because of this, the first licensed institutions naturally tend to favor those who are least likely to make mistakes, most trustworthy, and also most capable of taking on bank-level regulation.

So, if we absolutely have to answer “why the first batch went to big banks,” the truth is that the answer isn’t that dramatic.

It’s not because stablecoins are inherently for banks, but because in the early stages of the system, banks most closely fit the regulatory logic of “seek stability first, then expand.”

The first batch of licensing is about a safe start, not the industry’s final destination.

The truly interesting question has never been “why it was banks first,” but rather “after banks take the stage first, what kind of ecosystem will Hong Kong actually develop.”

From this perspective, the HKMA itself has already written the question on the blackboard.

The initial key scenarios it lists are not only cross-border payments and local payments, but also tokenized asset trading, collateral management, and programmable payments.

In other words, what Hong Kong issued this time is not just a license to “do payments,” but an access pass into on-chain financial infrastructure.

This difference is crucial. Because once you raise the perspective from “payments” to “on-chain finance,” many things that previously looked fragmented suddenly connect.

First, let’s look at the statements from the two licensed institutions themselves.

Anchorpoint led by Standard Chartered has publicly stated: HKDAP plans to roll out in phases starting in Q2 2026, using a B2B2C model. It will enter the public market through authorized distributors, and at the same time, it will incorporate into its first version roadmap the settlement and distribution of cross-border capital and payment flows, as well as tokenised real-world assets.

HSBC has also stated that it will launch a Hong Kong dollar stablecoin in the second half of 2026, and plans to integrate it with PayMe and the HSBC HK App. In the first phase, it will cover P2P, merchant payments, and tokenized investments.

That is to say, even the issuers themselves have not understood it as “issue a Hong Kong dollar coin first and deal with it later.” Instead, they are actively pointing in the direction of distribution, settlement, and asset transfer.

This also perfectly confirms a judgment I have been making: Hong Kong stablecoins do not need to compete with U.S. dollar stablecoins for global dominance, and there is no need to replicate the path the U.S. has taken.

A more rational place for them is to be the landing layer of Hong Kong’s local currency within the on-chain financial system—“the last leg/baton” after U.S. dollar stablecoins have finished building their cross-border corridors—and also the most natural settlement currency when Hong Kong local assets move onto the chain.

With the first batch of licenses landing today, this judgment has not changed; if anything, it has become clearer. The only change is that what used to be a structural judgment is now entering the execution phase.

2. A reference to the U.S. ecosystem: stablecoins are not just payment plugins—they are the “cash leg” of on-chain finance

To see clearly how the execution phase should be judged, the best reference is not Hong Kong itself, but the U.S.

Because the stablecoin story that the U.S. is truly running today is no longer “using stablecoins to pay for a cup of coffee.”

In July 2025, the GENIUS Act was signed into law, first bringing payment stablecoins into the federal regulatory framework.

By April 2026, relevant White House research documents have already clearly discussed its impact on the banking system based on 1:1 reserves, the range of eligible assets, and restrictions on stablecoin yields.

At the same time, broader legislation on digital asset market structure, the CLARITY Act, is also advancing. But on the issue of stablecoin yields/rewards, it is still stuck between the banking industry and the crypto industry.

What the U.S. solves first is “how payment stablecoins are formally incorporated into the dollar system.” As for the larger market structure rewrite, that is still on the way.

But the market did not wait until all bills fully settled before taking action.

After Stripe acquired Bridge, in 2025 it launched Stablecoin Financial Accounts, allowing companies in 101 countries to directly hold balances of dollar-denominated stablecoin accounts and move funds between the stablecoin track and the traditional finance track.

In the same year, it also rolled out Open Issuance via Bridge, enabling companies to issue and manage their own stablecoins.

What matters most here is not simply that “Stripe supports stablecoins,” but that Stripe has already moved stablecoins from the payment method into the account layer, treasury layer, and product layer.

Coinbase is following a different route that is highly representative.

It merged the original Coinbase Commerce into Coinbase Business, and it has deeply recognized that the way enterprises use stablecoins today is no longer just for receiving payments. It is a combination of custody, fiat offramps, payouts, accounting integrations, and payments.

Taking one step further, in 2025 Coinbase launched x402, sparking the narrative of agentic commerce, placing stablecoin payments directly on the HTTP layer so that APIs, apps, and AI agents can natively complete micropayments.

Once you see this, you understand that what the U.S. is discussing today is no longer whether “crypto payments can work,” but whether stablecoins can become the native cash layer for internet-native transactions and enterprise operations.

Visa’s actions also clearly show this.

It did not choose to become a new issuer itself. Instead, it continued embedding stablecoins into its core settlement network.

In December 2025, Visa announced USDC settlement in the U.S., and disclosed that annual stablecoin settlement volume has already exceeded 3.5 billion dollars.

Currently, through deep cooperation with Stripe and Bridge, and by joining the x402 Foundation, Visa has already incorporated stablecoins and an AI payment ecosystem built on stablecoins into its network of networks.

In many cases, stablecoins do not replace old networks; they rewrite the form of money circulating within old networks. The network may not be overturned first, but the first thing to be rewritten is the currency layer.

Looking even deeper, even payments are not the most interesting part of the U.S. stablecoin ecosystem.

The truly bigger change is on the asset side.

In March 2024, BlackRock launched BUIDL, putting money market fund shares onto public blockchains.

By the end of March 2026, Franklin Templeton’s Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund had an asset size of approximately 844 million dollars, with at least 99.5% invested in U.S. government securities, cash, and repurchase agreements fully collateralized by U.S. government securities or cash.

DTCC, after receiving an SEC no-action letter in December 2025, plans to launch a tokenization service for real-world assets held at DTC in the second half of 2026. This will cover Russell 1000, major index ETF products, and U.S. Treasuries.

Putting all of these together, you will find that what has emerged in the U.S. is not a “stablecoin track,” but an entire on-chain financial stack.

Stablecoins do on-chain cash; tokenized funds and Treasuries do on-chain assets; market infrastructure handles registration, circulation, and custody; and on top of that, payments, collateral, clearing, and distribution grow out.

This is also why I feel that when we analyze Hong Kong stablecoins, if we still only stop at “why the first batch licenses were issued to banks,” the overall picture is too small.

What Hong Kong is truly competing for today is not only stablecoin payments, but rather the local-currency interface, the settlement entry point, and the clearing position in the on-chain finance era.

Stablecoins are just the first brick. The real building will not be only a payment channel.

3. The real future of Hong Kong dollar stablecoins lies in the ecosystem

Of course, pessimists naturally focus on the negative implications.

They will think that the first batch being granted only to banks precisely shows that Hong Kong has locked innovation away.

Those most suited to defending the old system may not necessarily have the motivation to open up a new one.

This worry is not without reason.

Mature institutions usually lack neither technical capability nor compliance capability. What is truly scarce is whether they are willing to rewrite their own value chain.

They certainly are willing to absorb new technology into the old system, but they may not be willing to proactively push a new path that could dilute existing advantages.

But this pessimistic argument is only right for half.

The other half is that on-chain finance does not grow out of thin air.

Without a trustworthy local currency settlement layer, a compliant redemption mechanism, and entities capable of handling large flows and regulatory responsibilities, the subsequent ecosystem of payments, RWA, tokenization, and collateral management can only remain at the demo stage and fundraising stage.

The part of the U.S. today that has the most reference value is not “startups beating banks.” It’s that traditional finance, payment infrastructure companies, and native crypto companies are all in the same ecosystem and are redividing roles and collaborating.

Hong Kong’s decision to hand the first key to banks is not necessarily the end of innovation. It may more likely be that the hardest part of the foundation is being built first.

And because of this, I actually think that after the first batch of licenses are issued, what is truly worth looking at is not who has the licenses, but who can grow capabilities beyond the licenses.

Anchorpoint’s proactive B2B2C approach itself shows that issuers also understand that “having a license” does not equal “having users.”

OSL’s official statements are even more focused on the ecosystem: it welcomes the first batch of licenses, and positions itself around distribution, liquidity, and infrastructure cooperation.

This signal is important. It indicates that the initial concentration of issuance rights does not necessarily mean long-term value will also be concentrated the same way.

In the future, the real gap may not be between the issuance side, but between the distribution side, wallets, payment interfaces, trading platforms, custody, compliance middleware, and whoever can connect on-chain cash into real assets and real transactions.

After all, the hardest part of stablecoins has never been issuing them—it has always been keeping them.

Payments happen in an instant; treasury management lasts all night.

Whether enterprises today are willing to use Hong Kong dollar stablecoins for a settlement transaction only shows that there is channel value.

Whether enterprises tomorrow are willing to leave part of their operating funds in Hong Kong in the form of Hong Kong dollar stablecoins overnight is what shows that they are starting to have balance value.

Once settlement begins to convert into retention, stablecoins will shift from a payment tool to treasury/infrastructure.

Taking one step further, only when this portion of on-chain cash starts to naturally flow into tokenized funds, tokenized bonds, RWA trading, and collateral management will Hong Kong’s stablecoin ecosystem truly connect with the entire on-chain financial ecosystem.

This is also the point I care about most when looking at Hong Kong’s first batch of licenses today.

If Hong Kong dollar stablecoins are only understood as a faster payment method, their ceiling will not be very high.

Hong Kong’s local retail market is not large, and its payment infrastructure is already quite mature. Relying solely on front-end payment experience cannot tell a story big enough.

But if it is placed into a larger structure—as the on-chain settlement layer for local currency, connecting payments, treasury, RWA, tokenization, and cross-border capital flows—its meaning becomes completely different.

It is no longer just a Web3 product; it becomes part of Hong Kong’s digital financial infrastructure.

So, after this first batch of licenses are issued, my judgment is actually clearer than before.

Hong Kong’s first batch of stablecoin licenses indeed went first to the most prudent players.

That is very Hong Kong, and it is also reasonable.

But the true height of Hong Kong dollar stablecoins will not be determined by the initial list. It will be determined by whether they can grow into the local settlement layer of Hong Kong’s on-chain financial ecosystem.

Banks can open the door first. What truly determines whether the market has vitality is whether, later on, distribution, interfaces, assets, and usage can grow.

The first step has finally been taken. The real competition is only beginning.